Introduction
Emulation has long been recognized as an major force that shapes behaviour. Veblen (1924) de…ned emulation as "the stimulus of an invidious comparison which prompts us to outdo those with whom we are in the habit of classing ourselves." He claimed that "with the exception of the instinct for self-preservation, the propensity for emulation is probably the strongest and most alert and persistent of economic motives proper."According to Veblen "the motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same motive of emulation continues active in the further development of institution to which it has given rise and in the development of all those features of the social structure which this institution of ownership touches." Emulation in- This paper explores some possible consequences of emulation. As a metaphor, we model the setting of goals for athletes by their coaches who know that their athletes may perform better with some suitably chosen degree of emulation.
The Basic Model
Goal setting has been known to be a crucial element in achieving success, be it in sports, education, academia, or in the business world. Psychologists, researchers in sports science and management science have emphasized the importance of appropriate goal setting. (See Latham (1900a, 1990b) , Hardy et al. (1986) , Bell (1983) , Botterill (1983) , Cury and Sarrazin (1993) , among others.) It is generally recognized that, subject to goals being realistic, performance increases as the goals become more di¢ cult. This is known as "the hard goal e¤ect". (For empirical evidence in sports, see Beggs (1990) , Cury and Sarrazin (1993) .
Let us consider at …rst the simple case of an individual for whom a goal is already set. For example, parents set a school performance target (such as exam scores) for their children, a swimmer sets for himself a target of swimming across a river in A seconds. There are other such instances in business and in sport; for instance a seamstress in Montreal might have been instructed to reach a target of A shirts . The measurement of the goal A is assumed to be smooth. The exact time in which a 400 m hurdle or a 100 m backstroke are run or swam do matter. One can think of a salesperson who has a set target of numbers of items sold or clients recruited.
A bonus or a promotion might be the reward, and is linked to the size of the target.We attempt to capture these facets of the outcomes of competition in the following way. In our simple model we use a metric A to measure the value of the target but we also characterize the outcome as success or failure.
The probability of the agents, or athletes, achieving a set target depends on the e¤ort level, denoted by E, on the target itself A, as well as other factors such as innate ability or self-con…dence, denoted by . The higher the target, the less chance they will succeed, and the harder they strive, the more likely they are to meet their target. Clearly their perceived ability or 3 self-con…dence, , also improves their chances.
The prospect of success by an individual or a …rm depend on their own e¤orts and abilities but might also depend on other factors, such as how they perceive their environment and others. Their probability of success, hence their performance is possibly in ‡uenced by it.. The salesperson does not operate in an isolated environment. There are other sales people in the same …rm or perhaps in rival …rms. They also have set targets which also in ‡uence their likelihood of success. The central premise of this paper is that the goals, or targets, for which an individual's rivals are striving have a real in ‡uence on the probability of success of that individual. Agents are aware of the targets set for other agents, and their values relative to their own target forms the basis of the process we refer to as 'emulation'. Emulation, de…ned by the Webster's dictionary as "ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement)" is thus the main focus of the paper. It is important at this stage to clarify our use of the word 'emulation'.
We use it in its common meaning. This concept has been investigateded in the social sciences from the time of Bentham (1811) and later Veblen ( 1924) as discussed above. It is also used by applied game theorists in the context of a strategic choice ( e.g. Dana (2005) ) where emulation is akin to imitation. Other authors, particularly in the labor economics literature (e.g. Brown (1994) ) , see it as an incentive mechanism. While these enquiries are worthwile, we do not follow the same avenues in this paper. The concept of emulation that we use here is indeed more akin to the one used by experimental psychologists, although our purpose is entirely di¤erent. They conceive of emulation as an automatic process that originates in the brain of the subject;, see for instance Thompson and Russell (2004) , whereas analysts of industrial organization are more interested in the active process of choosing an emulation strategy as opposed to a di¤erentiation strategy. In this paper we take mainly the latter view that emulation, that of a natural process that depends on other individuals'goals reative to one's own, but we attempt to enrich it by taking into account the manner in which goals are set and by whom, thereby allowing interaction among goal setters.
We …rst consider a single individual who, if her target is A, her e¤ort E and her ability , has the probability p of achieving her goal
where is a factor re ‡ecting the strength of the challenge represented by the goal within this individual's environment. Here E is non-negative, and A, and are positive real numbers. The probability is clearly bounded by 1. It is an increasing function of E and a decreasing function of A. The factors that shape are examined in the next section.
We suppose that her objective is to maximize her expected utility of success net of e¤ort cost: This formulation implies that either (i) the individual gets zero utility if she fails to achieve the set target A (regardless of how "close" the actual performance is to the goal), or (ii) if the individual fails, she does not know how close she was to the goal. On the other hand the measurability of A accounts for the measurability of many sporting records and sales targets.
We assume for simplicity that u(A) = A where 0 < < 1
Then the athlete's expected utility (net of e¤ort cost) is
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The athlete takes A and as given. She chooses E to maximize W .
The …rst order condition implies
Clearly, E (A( ; ); ; ) = 0:The function E (A; ; ) as given by (4) has a positive derivative at A = 0 and a negative derivative at A = A( ; ).
Thus it has an inverted U-shape if the equation @E =@A = 0 has a unique solution, which is in fact the case. One interpretation is that if the coach sets a goal larger than A, the athlete quits. This is a consequence of the universally accepted stronger convexity of costs (linear) over bene…ts (concave).
It also re ‡ects the fact that one cannot push people to ever greater heights of achievement by simply challenging them to do so.This inverted U-shape property is a theoretically and empirically accepted tenet of the psychology We now introduce the competitive environment in which the athlete, or salesperson, operates. In this context the in ‡uence of the set target A is not constant. Let us say that the strenghth of the challenge, as she perceives it, depends on her environment. We must point out that, in our model, the athletes (or salespersons) are not competing against one another in a given 6 contest. One could say they are competing against "nature"or "the market", trying to break an individually imposed record, or reaching a target in a business environment, keeping a wary eye on the competition.We refer to this process as 'emulation'and model it as a function homogenous of degree zero in all goals. That is, if all targets are doubled, the emulation factors for each of the rivals, remain unchanged. Any other assumption than homogeneity would impose an arbitrary scale on the process. One may be tempted to argue that doubling all the targets would have negative e¤ect on the probability of success. While this is a valid argument, the e¤ect of the individual's own goal on their probability of success is already accounted for in our formulation of the probability of success. Hence the setting of higher goals does have a negative e¤ect of its own, but we have kept it separate from the environmental e¤ect of emulation by setting the degree of homogeneity in all goals to zero.
To this end we assume the following structure (where, for simplicity, there is only one rival) . It is partly inspired by Tullock's hypothesis about probablity of success in a n-person contest for rents 1 . We take the probability that individual 1 will be successful in reaching target A 1 while exerting e¤ort E 1 , her ability or self-con…dence level being 1 and her emulation factor z 1 , which replaces the constant , to be
Here E 1 is non-negative, A 1 , 1 and z 1 are positive real numbers and z 1 incorporates "emulative factors". As indicated we assume that the emulation factor z 1 is a function that depends solely on the relative goals set for both 1 See Tullock (1980) , where the probability of success of agent i is
See also Hillman and Riley (1989) for a detailed treatment of the case of contests among heterogeneous agents.
athletes. Therefore if both athletes'goals are doubled, the emulation factor is unchanged. In other words the emulation function is a function of A 2 =A 1 x only and
.
Recall that the athletes are not competing against one another.They are trying to break individually imposed records, or reaching targets in a market environment.
Whether the athlete has set her goal A 1 or the coach has set it for her, the athlete chooses her e¤ort level E 1 0, given A 1 and z 1 . Therefore the problem is as for the isolated individual
Again for simplicity u(A 1 ) = A 1 where 0 < < 1
And the …rst order condition implies
Remarks:
Since the level of e¤ort chosen by the athlete is a function of goal A 1 , we can de…ne the endogenous probability of success, given the goal A 1 , as follows:
Using (3) and (4) we get:
Thus, given z 1 , the higher the goal, the lower is the probability of achieving the target, once the e¤ort level has been chosen.
where x A 2 =A 1 .
The Emulation Factor
When the athlete was on her own we used the following formulation for the probability of success
Now that we wish to investigate the e¤ect of emulation on the probability of success, we replace by z 1 with
with x = A 2 =A 1 . If = 0 there is no emulation but as increases the emulative e¤ect becomes stronger. The scaling factor k still has a role in determining the e¤ect of A 1 on p 1 .
Consider the function f (x) that represents the emulation/intimidation psychological process. When f (x) = k, or = 0, we have the previous case of no emulation.
9
Let us now consider the psychological phenomenon we wish to analyze.
It must apply equally to both athletes. That is, whichever way athlete 1 is in ‡uenced by athlete 2 having a target twice as big, athlete 2 must be in ‡u-enced in the same way if athlete 1 has twice her target. Otherwise they would be subject to di¤erent psychological processes and our aim is to investigate the one process. It is obvious that di¤erent people may react di¤erently to rivalry but our aim here is not to investigate the interesting empirical di¤erences between people in this respect. Our aim is to investigate the consequences of one emulation process, hence some assumption of symmetry -not identity -is required. Suppose for now that the emulation process is entirely symmetrical. This translates into a restriction on f (x). We require that
as A 2 =A 1 and A 1 =A 2 have the same emulative e¤ect.
This in turn, with di¤erentiability, implies
It follows that f (x) cannot be monotone.
If f (x) were to rise initially this would imply that, given A 1 , a lower but increasing A 2 would decrease p 1 : athlete 1 would be intimidated by another athlete setting increasing but much lower goals. This seems unreasonable if we wish to consider a process of emulation.We argue that, on the contrary, athlete 1 is stimulated by athlete 2 setting higher and higher goals and thus f (x) is initially decreasing. This must be reversed after x reaches 1 to be consistent with (9); therefore f (x) goes through a minimum at that point.
Consequently if the …rst athlete's goal A 1 is weighted by f (A 2 =A 1 ) = f (x).
The second athlete's goal, A 2 , must be weighed by f (A 1 =A 2 ) = f (x 1 ) since 10 we insist that the emulation factor works symmetrically for both athletes.
Thus their respective probabilities of success are
-emulation for athlete 1-increases her probability of success (hence f 0 (x) < 0 for x < 1). But this cannot last forever and at some point an increase in the goal set by a seemingly more con…dent competitor will have the opposite e¤ect: emulation morphs into intimidation. (There is some empiral evidence that seems to support this hypothesis: marginal students who are admited to elite schools, where they belong to the bottom group of students, do not perform better than equally able students who attend regular schools, where they belong to the best group, Clark (2007)).
This translates into the folowing assumptions on h(x):
h(1) = 0 (12)
with also
While we have so far assumed that identically able athletes have the strongest emulation e¤ect on eachother's probability of success, this is not necessarily so.
Indeed we argue that the strongst emulation is felt by an athlete when she is confronted by another who aims for a higher goal, but not too much higher.
The consequence of this is that the function f (x) will reach its minimum at an x value larger than 1, say c > 1. This of course implies that at the x value where athlete 1 is most strongly stimulated by athlete 2 at x = c, the converse is not true because athlete 2 faces c 1 .
The function f (x) therefore must have the typical shape represented in This shape is strictly a consequence of assuming that while a competitor sets a goal smaller than c time yours, any increase in it will stimulate you to a better performance -in terms of probability -and that the psychological laws that apply to you also applies to her.
The Coach' s Choices and the Nash Equilibrium
Each coach will set the goal for his athlete, given the goal set by the other coach. Each will maximize
which represents the expected value of the payo¤ of his athlete. The …rst order condition is
At an interior equilibrium, I(x ) > 0, as is clear from the FOC.
The second order condition is
i.e.
Similarly, for coach 2,
the …rst order condition is
where y 1=x.
At an interior equilibrium, J(x ) > 0, as is clear from the FOC.
The SOC is
Notes: From
we get
At a Nash equilibrium, both (16) and (??) hold therefore
where R p 1 = 2 . We may call R the relative con…dence of athlete 1. If the emulation factor is absent (i.e. = 0), the Nash equilibrium characterization becomes
Therefore in the absence of emulation there is a unique Nash equilibrium where the ratio of the goals set is equal to the ratio of the athletes'con…dence levels raised to a power equal to a quarter of the athletes's relative risk aversion. It is easy to check that this Nash equilibrium is stable.
It follows that, if the emulation e¤ect is small ( small) there is a unique stable Nash equilibrium in the space of pure strategies (choosing a goal for one's athlete).
Furthermore, di¤erentiating (24) yields
and when = 0, I(x) = J(x) = + 1 and
Therefore, without any emulation e¤ect an increase in the relative con…dence of athlete 1 results in a higher goal ratio in favour of athlete 1. As increases and the emulation e¤ect becomes stronger the uniqueness and even the existence of the Nash equilibrium in pure startegies cannot be guaranteed.
In order to demonstrate this and to investigate the behaviour of the new
equilibrium it su¢ ces to analyze a typical example. 16 
A Representative Example
We have argued that the emulation phenomenon as we conceive it must correspond to a function f (x) as illustrated in Figure 1 .
One such function is
We set the scales of the con…dence and e¤ort costs by setting b = 1=1:15
and 1 = 1 and the strength of the emulation process by setting k = 0:75, 1 = 1 and 2 = 2. Hence only 2 will be variable. We also choose = 0:6, hence = 0:2 and c = 1:25. This choice of c means that one athlete strives most to emulate another whose goal is 25% higher. A 10% higher goal doesn't emulate her as much, nor a 35% higher goal; a 30% lower goal provides In Figure 6 we have traced the reaction function of coach 1 (RF 2) when 2 = 1 (as well as the reaction function of coach 2 (RF 1), as in Figure 2 ). The reaction function of coach 2 depends on the value of 2 which is allowed to vary. Unsurprisingly the two reaction functions have symmetric shapes and there is a critical value of A c 1 that sections o¤ parts of the "hump". This A c 1 value will shift with 2 . For the time being we focus on 2 > 1 = 1. The shape of RF 2 is sensitive to the value of 2 (since 1 = 1). We illustrate this in Figure 7 , with 2 = 2, instead of 2 = 1 as it was in Figure 6 . For values of 2 much above that range, only the lower arm of RF 2 can ever intersect with RF 1; the upper arm is much too high. When 2 is not too far above 1, there is an intersection between the lower arm of RF 2 and the upper arm of RF 1 resulting in a unique stable Nash equilibrium in the approximate range (0:2; 2:7), depending on the value of 2 . One is reprensented in Figure 8 27 rium in pure srategies. The Nash equilibrium is to be sought among mixed strategies.
We now proceed to characterize these mixed strategy equilibria. Consider Figure 2 and the vertical line marking the critical value of A c 1 = 3:79 at which coach 1 is indi¤erent between playing the highest goal, say A 1H , or the lowest goal, say A 1L . This is because they correspond to the two A 1 values yielding identical global maxima for 1 as shown in Figure 4 . Therefore coach 1 must choose 0 q 1 1 and play A 1H with probability q 1 and A 1L with probability
(1 q 1 ). He will choose q 1 so that coach 2's best move is to choose A Note that x H corresponds to A 1H and x L to A 1L , so x H is the smaller one.
Coach 2 chooses A 2 to maximize his expected payo¤
which yields the …rst-order condition
The value q 1 that will incite coach 1 to choose A 2 = A c 2 is therefore
The values of q 1 that yields that mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be tabulated against 2 (with b = 1=1:15). These are shown in Table 1 Thus we have dealt with the case where 2 > 1 = 1: Consider now the reverse situation. From ( 1 = 1; 2 = 1) we proceed to increase 1 : It is obvious that the reverse symmetric situation would be repeated exactly.
Therefore on either side of the symmetric equilibrium when 1 = 2 = x = 1
we begin with a phase of a still unique and stable Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. When the "moving" i reaches the critical value of 3:3452; the other coach plays a mixed strategy as described in Table 1 , pinning coach i to A c i = 3:79: As i passes 4:061 and keeps increasing, the other coach chooses a low and decreasing goal, while coach i increases his. Therefore the transition to and from mixed strategy equilibria is as smooth as the changes in i .
The above describes all types of solutions when the 's are above 1.
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Suppose now that instead of following a separate branch from ( 1 = 2 = 1) by letting 2 increase, we still keep 1 = 1 but now decrease 2 below 1.
We have the same type of solutions and the same phases as when 1 = 1 < 2 but, while RF 1 remains as we described it, RF 2 now shrinks and the scale of the solution (in terms of A 1 and A 2 ) also shrinks. When 1 = 1 and 2 << 1 coaches eventually settle for extremely low goals re ‡ecting one of the athletes'low ability:
We now calculate the values of all the relevant variables at the values of 2 for which we illustrated equilibria. See Table 2 . We …rst focus on the results for team 1, as 2 increases from 1 to 2. Clearly emulation works well at …rst; the coach sets a higher goal and the athlete tries harder; the coach's pro…t also increases. However at the higher 2 value of 3, although a high goal is set, the athlete slacks o¤, the probability of success decreases much and the coach is worse o¤ than at the symmetric equilbrium. When 2 is at 4:4, the coach has stopped trying to set high goals, the athlete has stopped trying much at all and pro…t is abysmal. For team 2 the results are as expected as the athlete gets better and better: her coach sets higher goals, she tries harder and pro…ts increase. Let us now consider the mixed strategy equilibrium.When = 3:5, coach 1 plays a mixed strategy equilibrium with q 1 = 0:7755: Coach 2 is pinned to a pure strategy, playing the critical A c 1 value. This resullts in two very di¤erent choices for team 1, but the pro…t is the same, by construction. The ratios of goal values, hence the x values change by a factor of more than 10, hence the emulation factor is strongly a¤ected. This is re ‡ected in the A values for both athletes. Note that the pro…t of coach 2 is very high at the High equilibrium. This results in an expected pro…t of E( 2 ) = 1:111(since q 1 = 0:7755), the highest in our sample. Clearly coach 2 is very happy when coach 1 plays High because the emulation of athlete 1 contributes to the performance of his athlete. The higher 2 , the more this process works; however as 2 increases, q 1 decreases 30 and this eventually lowers the expected pr…t of coach 2. Table 2 6 Conclusion
Using a model of performance based on ability, e¤ort and the e¤ect of goal setting, we have introduced the notion of emulation that accounts for the e¤ect of another participant's goals on the probability of success of an individual. We argued that the individual not only chooses her e¤ort to maximize utility, but also reacts to the goals set by her own coach and the coach of another individual. Speci…cally the e¤ect of the goal set by her coach on her probability of success is in ‡uenced by a function of the ratio of her own goal and that of another individual in a process of emulation, which is the main aspect analyzed in this paper. The structure of this emulation process is discussed at length and results in a situation of strategic interaction between the athletes and guided by their coaches.
This produces a stable Nash equilibrium when the interaction e¤ect is small and an increase in the ability of the more able athlete results in a higher goal ratio in her favour.
Beginning with identically able atheletes, as one athlete's abilty increases, both athletes'set goals are increased but the more able one's increases faster at …rst. At some critical point the coach of the less able athlete shifts to a mixed strategy that pins the other coach to a single pure strategy. That critical is a well de…ned value of the goal set for the better athlete, but 31 it is reached when the ability of that athlete itself reaches a critical level.
Interestingly the payo¤ for the coach pinned to pure strategy reaches its highest level then. As the better athlete keeps getting better, the coach of the other one reverts to a pure strategy, but one in which he chooses considerably lower goals. Furthermore he sets his goals lower and lower as the other athlete keeps getting better and better, her own coach setting higher and higher goals.
Thus we have demonstrated that this emulation process does encourage the setting of higher goals for some range, but as the discrepancy between athletes passes a critical point, one of the coaches begins setting much lower goals for his athlete in random but precisely calculated fashionand and, after another critical level of discrepancy, always sets very low goals.
Further research may consider introducing ability levels in addtion to set goals in the emulation function.
